Sunday, May 15, 2011

Stranger in a Strange Land

While reading Robert Heinlein's Stranger in a Strange Land, I found one of the most important aspects of the book to be the many subtle conversations the author has with the reader. There are many points where Heinlein has two or more characters talk to each other for an extended period of time on a subtopic, such as art, history, literature, or economics, to name a few, and I believe there was more to this than a simple character conversation. Heinlein is attempting to engage the reader directly by finding something that they will likely be interested in and offering his views to them. When his characters Jubal Harshaw and Ben Caxton speak about art, for instance, it is a chance for Heinlein to offer up his views through Harshaw, while he uses Caxton to give the kind of general responses the reader might feel like giving. Stranger in a Strange Land is almost entirely a philosophical discourse between character to character on one level, and author to reader on another. This has the effect of pulling the reader in, as you start to feel less like you are reading and more like you are being spoken to. This is strongest with the main character, Valentine Michael Smith, who always speaks directly about humanity's flaws and ways to overcome them; Heinlein is using him to tell you what might be wrong with you, and to comfort you by offering you ways to change. This is a strange approach that I have never found in any other book that I have read, so I noted it as something that specifically interested me about Stranger in a Strange Land.

Does an author who attempts to change the opinions of his readers change the very nature of the story in his/her novel?

Defining Art

It is hard for one to define art, even though it is usually obvious to one what is art. I believe that art is that which we can label as having a greater significance after observation by aesthetic principles. There are certain qualities and criteria an art critic will look for; these can be culturally, personally, and socially biased. Not to say that art is subjective, only the person's perception of the art. A work can be considered art without necessarily appearing as such to each and every observer. If that were the case, than a vast majority of the younger population could declare Mozart no longer a valuable composer as all his symphonies are not art, and their four-chord-progression screaming would be the new high art. Thus, art cannot be subjective to either one person or a group of people. However, art is still observable by those who can find, aesthetically, a greater significance in the work. Once they find something pleasing that elevates the work higher than just the ordinary, it has the potential to be considered artwork. However, just because it is aesthetically pleasing does not make it art. Art also has to exist on some level of intellect; it has to provoke thought at some level. Without this, it stops being art, and simply becomes entertainment. So those are my criteria for art: it cannot be subjective, it has to have a greater significance than the ordinary, it has to be aesthetically pleasing or displeasing, and it must provoke some level of thought.

Why might be other definitions of art that contradict this definition?

Monday, April 25, 2011

Torture Part 4: Justification

The main question surrounding torture today is whether or not there is ever a case where it is justifiable. Would torturing someone to save the lives of thousands be considered right? Can you torture someone to save the life of just one other person? What if that one person is close to you, and your judgment clouded by your own distress? Can you ever really be certain that the person you are torturing is going to tell you what you want to know in time, or that they even know anything at all? It seems as though there is a never-ending stream of questions that jeopardize any attempt to legitimize an instance of torture. When, then, could we say it is acceptable, or is there ever even a case where it is? To save the life of one other person is to say that the attempted murder committed by the recipient is more heinous an act than the torture used against them to prevent that murder. To torture in order to save the lives of thousands is to say that, despite the probability of not getting the proper information in time or even having the right person to torture, it is acceptable to at least try because of what is at stake. Whether or not to torture becomes increasingly relative, almost to the point of there being no case in which every question is answered sufficiently and efficiently enough to justify the act before the torture even begins. So, is it then right to say that anyone who engages in an act of torture has ignored one of these questions, and is therefore acting immorally? I believe that it is. Without sufficient justification prior to torturing, the act then becomes questionable and, because of its incredibly violent nature, immoral.

In what hypothetical cases could torture be completely justified, if any?
Are any of these cases realistic or probable enough to reasonably institutionalize or excuse torture?

Torture Part 3: Mental

Defining extreme mental pain is significantly more difficult than defining physical pain simply because it is so much more subjective. Not everyone can be tortured mentally in the same ways. A sociopath would not give in so easily to seeing friends and family tortured as a mentally sound person, nor would the average person be distressed as easily by certain cases where any number of a group of animals such as rats, spiders or snakes were introduced as someone who had a phobia of these animals. A person's metal fortitude also becomes a factor, as many terrorists have likely undergone training to desensitize themselves, as well as having a goal in mind that is important enough to them to withstand the mental distress at any cost to themselves until their objective is complete. Extreme mental torture, then, is only truly discernible in the aftermath; does the recipient develop a phobia, or some kind of mental disorder, or do they suffer an extreme physical reaction as a result of their mental stimuli (e.g. a heart attack or going into shock)? Mental torture, unlike physical torture, is a true gamble; you can never be sure of exactly how much you are going to damage a person when distressing them psychologically, as every person is different.

Torture Part 2: Physical

To define physically hurting a person, one must be causing the recipient distress in a bodily manner. To define the extreme physical pain required for torture becomes a case by case scenario. If a person is restrained and the torturer has the objective of breaking their will for some purpose, then all that is left is to cause severe physical pain. If, for instance, the torturer decided to simply slap the recipient, then the pain is not necessarily extreme. It is highly unlikely that a terrorist in a ticking-bomb scenario would give in to his captors if they were causing him a physical distress that could be easily managed. Excessively harming the person, such as cutting them in multiple places, searing their skin with hot irons, drilling through their teeth or sticking needles underneath their fingernails is a case where the recipient may, eventually, reveal the information. However, since the method used to obtain this information has now reached a point of extreme physical violence, then the case has become one of torture. To define "extreme physical pain" in any case is subjective, although there the eventuality to which a majority would agree that there is, in fact, a discernible point of "extreme" on a case by case basis.

Torture Part 1: Definition

There is a reason why torture must include the following: 1. A restriction of autonomy, 2. The desire to break the recipient's will, and 3. the use of extreme physical or mental pain/anguish. To remove any or two of the three breaks the definition of torture, and the act simply becomes another instance entirely.
Cases involving only certain criteria:
#1: This is simply restricting a person's ability to do things on their own, such as a parent holding back their child from crossing the street when cars are coming, to putting a prisoner in jail or a rehabilitation center to, in the former, make society safer, and, in the latter, make the criminal a better person. This is not torture, it is simply confinement.
#2: A person's will can be broken through coercion, and torture is a form of extreme coercion. However, offering a person a large sum of money in return for information is not torture, though tempting their greed can be seen as a way of breaking their will. Whether or not what the person then reveals is true is not important; an attempt has been made to break their will, and it could work, given proper circumstances. This is simply coercion.
#3: Hurting a person without the intent to gain information from their or without restricting their autonomy is one of two cases: either it is malicious, and is just violence, or it is abuse, and abuse, by it's own definition, is a separate case from torture.
#1 and #2: A person who is restricted who's will is made to be broken results in a number of cases that are not actually torture. A prisoner wants to be free, but they are held in jail. They also may hold a desire to harm others, but, in the ideal prison scenario, then punishment they are undergoing is an attempt to deter them from doing such. However, a prisoner rarely undergoes mental or physical pain; in that case, it would be torture. A prisoner who is simply kept in his cell and prohibited from committing the violent or illegal acts that landed him/her there is not torture, then.
#1 and #3: A person who is restricted and is undergoing extreme physical or mental pain is not being tortured, they are being radically abused. If there is no desire to break their will, then the case becomes one of maliciousness on the part of the propagator; they are hurting another with no desired outcome, and it is not clear when they will stop, or if they will stop before the recipient has died due to their condition.
#2 and #3: Holding a gun to a person on the street is not a restriction of autonomy. It is, however, an attempt to break the person's will, whether they are being robbed or questioned for information, and it can become a case of extreme physical or mental pain, e.g., shooting the victim in non-vital places so as to break their will, or turning the gun on a family member or loved one so as to cause anguish on the part of the victim. It is possible to harm someone for a reason without breaking their autonomy, and as long as the person has a way to escape or fight back, and is aware that they have this choice, then it is not torture, it is simply violence.
It is the meshing of these three criteria, then, that defines torture. A person must be restrained, they must be undergoing extreme physical or mental distress, and the torturer must have some objective in mind that involves breaking the person's will.

Friday, April 15, 2011

A Tale of Three Blacksmiths

This is an explanation that shows what I believe to be the differences between benign and invidious envy, as well as fitting or unwarranted envy.
There are three blacksmiths in the same village. They all vary in skill level; one is fairly good with the basics, the second is becoming very good at specific kinds of tasks, specifically weapons and armor, and the third is a master of all trades. Their king comes to town, looking to promote one of them to head blacksmith back at the keep. He decides to promote the second one, the one who is good with weapons and armor. When the other two hear of this, they both becomes envious of the prestigious position, but for different reasons. The beginner blacksmith decides that, in order to impress other potential employers, he will continue to improve his trade and become the best in the land. This is benign envy. The master blacksmith, however, is angry, and thinks that he should have gotten the position. This is invidious envy. He goes on to become upset with his mediocre counterpart, thinking he should have gotten the position and that the man who did is unworthy. This is resentment. As well as these forms of envy, it could be said that the beginner blacksmith's envy was fitting, for he was upset but did not deserve the position, while the master's envy was warranted, as he was the most qualified candidate and therefore has justification for the way he feels.

Why might the assumptions I have made about what these characters feel and why they should feel what they do be wrong?